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THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE DECISIONS OF THE ITALIAN
SUPREME COURT OF CASSATION
HON. ANTONIO BRANCACCIO"
INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, countries of common law and civil
law traditions have undergone a process which has brought them
closer together. This process can be traced back to the common
conviction that law does not consist merely of complex, abstract
norms, but rather of decisions made in applying these norms. In
other words, it is the decisions of the courts which constitute the
law in force. Thus, any understanding of the protection of hu-
man rights requires reference to the decisions of judges who are
called upon to decide cases in which this protection is challenged
at both the international and national levels.
At the national level, the decisions of supreme courts take on
particular importance. I would like to refer briefly to the deci-
sions of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation concerning the
fundamental question of the direct effect of international sources
on the protection of human rights in my country.
It should perhaps be mentioned that the decisions of the
Italian Court of Cassation' are not binding as precedent when
Former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Cassation of Italy.
'See generally ANGELO GRISOLI, GUIDE To FOREIGN LEGAL MATERIALS-ITALIAN
(C. Szladits ed., 1965). The Italian court system is divided into courts of ordinary
jurisdiction, which deal with civil and criminal matters, and courts of special juris-
diction, which primarily deal with constitutional questions. The Court of Cassation
is the highest court in the hierarchy of ordinary courts in the Italian legal system.
Id. at 32-35. The primary task of the Court of Cassation is to assure the uniform
interpretation of the law. Id. at 34. The Court of Cassation hears cases after they
have been appealed and determines whether the lower courts properly applied the
law. If the law has been properly applied, the Court of Cassation will not grant re-
course. If the challenged decision does not comply with the law, however, the Court
quashes the decision below and remands the case to a lower court to render a deci-
sion that complies with its ruling on the law. Id. at 35.
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the question decided comes before other courts or is brought up
again before the Court itself.2 The authority of such decisions,
however, is such that it will undoubtedly have a guiding effect on
future decisions.3 This is a sufficient justification for limiting my
remarks to these decisions.
I. INTERNATIONAL SOURCES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS
The international sources for the protection of human rights,
referred to in the decisions of the Court of Cassation, are the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms ["Convention"],4 signed in Rome on November 4,
1950, and entered into force in Italy in 1955;' and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ["Covenant"],6
adopted in New York on December 16, 1966, and given effect in
2 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 149-54, 270-73
(1967). Traditionally, judicial decisions are not binding precedents in subsequent
Italian cases. Id. at 150, 270. This stems from the strict historical distinction in the
civil law where the legislature makes the law and the judiciary applies it. Id. There-
fore, if the decisions of the court had effect beyond the limits of the case, the courts
would engage in functions reserved to the legislature. Id.
3 See CAPPELLETI ET AL., supra note 2, at 152. The Court of Cassation explicitly
recognizes the need for uniformity in judicial interpretation of the law. Id. The court
creates "massime," or headnotes that express the rules of law on which the court
bases its decisions. Id. Lawyers and judges utilize these massime to help them un-
derstand the law. See id. In a practical sense, the rulings of the court take on the
force of law. Id. at 153.
4 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention's goal was
to enforce the fundamental human freedoms. Id. § I. Members of the Council of
Europe sought to secure for everyone within the jurisdiction of the council the same
fundamental rights which were enumerated in the articles of the Convention. Id.
The rights enumerated include: life, freedom from torturous punishment, freedom
from servitude, liberty, a fair hearing and trial, family life, freedom of thought, re-
ligion, peaceful assembly, and freedom from discrimination. Id. § I, art. 2-9, 11. The
Convention also sets up the European Commission of Human Rights as well as the
European Court of Human Rights to ensure enforcement of these freedoms. Id. § II,
art. 19.
5 BASIS DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 326 (Ian Brownlie ed., 3d ed. 1992).
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). The provisions of
the Covenant create rights and duties to help protect human freedom and dignity.
Id. at pmbl. The Covenant is binding international law on the member states to help
protect the peoples of the world. Id. at pt. 2, art. 2. The Covenant affirms the right
to have violations redressed. See generally Louis HENKIN, THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 32-71 (Louis Hen-
kin ed. 1981) (discussing the development and impact of the Covenant).
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Italy in 1977.' Additionally, reference is frequently made to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,8 adopted and pro-
claimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in New
York on December 10, 1948.' The question of the direct effect of
this particular document within our legal system, however, has
not yet arisen. All questions of this nature are encompassed
within the issue of the direct internal effect of the Convention
and the Covenant.
As far as the Convention is concerned, the Court of Cassa-
tion has been criticized for not addressing this question until
many years after the implementing legislation. Two reasons
have been articulated to account for this delay. First, it is due to
the slight and superficial knowledge of the Convention possessed
by lawyers and judges. Lawyers either did not invoke the appli-
cation of the Convention, or they sought to invoke the principles
of the Convention in such a vague manner that judges were hesi-
tant to apply them.
The second reason is the widely-held belief that Italian do-
mestic sources, the Italian Constitution and ordinary laws, sub-
stantially exhaust the protection of human rights covered by the
Convention. This apprehension of domestic law preemption by
international laws is not unique to Italian jurisprudence. A
similar delay can be seen in the behavior of judges in other coun-
tries. In France, for example, the Convention only began to be
applied in the second half of the 1970's.0 The question of the di-
rect application of the Covenant does not have the same history
as the Convention. Thus, what will be said about the latter is
equally valid for the former.
II. APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION AND THE COVENANT
The question of the application of the Convention and the
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6.
" Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The Declaration enumerates generally
accepted principles concerning human freedoms. Id. at pmbl. These principles were
approved by the unanimous vote of the General Assembly of the United Nations and
were later codified by the Convention and Covenant. See Edward D. Re, Judicial
Enforcement of International Human Rights, 27 AKRON L. REV. 281, 283-85 (1994).
" Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 8.
'0 See generally ANDREW Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
CONVENTION IN DOMEsTIc LAW 70-81, 145-54 (1983) (analyzing adoption of interna-
tional law by Italy and France).
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Covenant has been dealt with primarily in decisions concerning
criminal cases. Therefore, it is on these cases that I will concen-
trate. The Court's first reaction after becoming aware of the ex-
istence of this question was to deny the direct effect of the Con-
vention within our legal system. Thus, the decisions of the Court
of Cassation affirmed that the provisions of the Convention bind
states only in their relationships with other states and do not af-
fect a state's relationship with individuals. These provisions
were held to be of a programmatic nature and therefore could not
modify domestic law."
This theory was justified using two arguments. First, it was
assumed that the Convention anticipates an exhaustive system
of protection for a violation of human rights through recourse to
two international bodies-the Commission 2 and the European
" See CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 2, at 58 (stating that some provisions of
Italian Constitution are enforceable and others are programmatic, thus imposing
duty on Parliament but not creating legal right in individuals); Antonio La Pergola
& Patrick Del Duca, New International Law in National Systems: Community Law,
International Law and the Italian Constitution, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 600 (1985)
(finding that Italy's Constitutional Court has decided to consider laws of Convention
and Covenant as external, autonomous legal system and therefore laws are "not
modifiable by ordinary legislative action and ... [are] ... immediately applicable by
all judges rather than only through centralized constitutional review."). Article 10 of
the Italian Constitution concerns "conforming the national legal order to customary
international law." Id. at 601. The practical effect of article 10 is that customary in-
ternational law takes precedence over subsequent domestic statutory law. Id. at
603. But see MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 166-67 ( Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds. 1989) (stating in Italy
"Convention is directly applicable but with a status equal to ordinary national law
and thus susceptible to supersession by subsequent national law").
2European Commission of Human Rights. See Convention, supra note 4, § II,
Art. 19 (establishing commission). Section III and IV of the Convention, Articles 20-
31, 33-37, and 48 discuss the composition and activity of the Commission. Id. § III,
art. 20-31, 33-37, § IV, art. 48. Under the Convention, any case submitted to the
European Court of Human Rights originates through application to the Commission.
Id. § IV, art. 47. The Commission determines the admissibility of the application by
ensuring that all domestic remedies have been exhausted and that the application
has been submitted less than six months from the date of a final decision by the
state courts involved. Id. § III, art. 25-28. Once the application has been deemed
admissible, the Commission investigates the case and encourages the parties to
reach an amicable settlement. Id. § III, art. 28-31. If a settlement cannot be reached,
the Commission writes a report containing an opinion as to whether a State has
violated the norms of the Convention. Convention, supra note 4, § III, art. 31. This
report is submitted to the Committee of Ministers at the Council of Europe. Id.
Within three months, the Commission may then refer the case to the European
Court of Human Rights. See VINCENT BERGER, 1 CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2-3 (1989); LAWS, RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN CON-
VENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 17-18 (Jacob Sundberg ed., 1986).
[Vol. 70: 101
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Court of Human Rights. 3 These fully enforceable rights cannot
directly benefit the individual before the courts of his own coun-
try due to the particular conditions of this system.
Secondly, reference was made to Article 57 of the Conven-
tion, which obliges every high contracting party, at the request of
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, to explain how
its internal law ensures the effective implementation of all the
provisions contained in the Convention." It was also assumed
that Article 57 excluded a provision stating that the protections
promulgated at the Convention were a direct part of domestic
law.
The opposite view was taken by the trial judges and certain
administrative judges who affirmed the norms of the Convention
not only as domestic law, but also as constitutional law. This
approach, however, was consistently rejected by the Court of
Cassation's decisions and by the Constitutional Court. 5 This
view will therefore not be further addressed but mention was
made of it to provide a brief glimpse into the extent of this de-
bate.
At the beginning of the 1980's, after a rather extended pe-
riod of resistance to new ideas, some of the Court of Cassation's
decisions acknowledged that the norms of the Convention were
immediately and directly applicable to domestic cases. The ex-
ception is those provisions whose contents are considered so
vague in their terms as to not indicate sufficiently clear situa-
tions.
'3 European Court of Human Rights. See Convention, supra note 4, § 4, art. 38-
56 (regulating and organizing European Court of Human Rights). The Court was
established to "ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High
Contracting Parties in the present Convention." Id. § 2, art. 19(b). The European
Court of Human Rights is located in Strasbourg, France and consists of judges from
the countries who are members of the Council of Europe. Convention, supra note 4,
§ IV, art. 38. Its purpose is to enforce the obligations of the parties under the Con-
vention. Id. § IV, art. 45. The vast majority of applications to the court are made by
individuals claiming human rights violations by their own countries. See Daniel S.
Sullivan, Effective International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and the Necessary
Condition of Liberal Democracy, 81 GEO. L.J. 2369, 2374-75 (1993).
"4 Convention, supra note 4, § 5, art. 57.
15 See GRISOLI, supra note 1, at 35-36. The Constitutional Court is considered
the highest court of the country. Its function is to oversee the application of the
Constitution of the Republic. Id. at 35. It has jurisdiction to decide cases concerning
the constitutionality of federal and regional law, the conflicts between state and re-
gional courts, the admissibility of requests for referenda, and the impeachment of
the highest government officials. Id. at 35-36.
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Since other decisions continued to uphold the previous and
opposing view, a conflict came about which required the inter-
vention of the United Criminal Divisions of the Court (Sezioni
Unite Penali). This is the extended panel of the supreme court
which adjudicates the most important cases, or cases in which
there have been contrasting precedents of the individual divi-
sions of the court. 6 In 1988, the United Divisions passed judg-
ment on the appeal of Paolo Castro, accepting the immediate
applicability of the norms of the Convention in Italy.17
In this respect, the court made three observations. First, it
observed that from a reading of Articles 1 and 13 of the Conven-
tion"8 it is apparent that the high contracting parties must secure
a direct recognition of the rights and freedoms defined in the
Convention itself. Therefore, it is responsible for more than only
to "undertake to respect" these rights and freedoms, as was
stated in the first version of the draft Convention.19 Second, pro-
tection at the international level does not exclude protection by
national judges, but serves to reinforce this protection by con-
trolling the way in which national judicial authorities ensure re-
spect for these rights. The opposing argument, drawn from the
protections afforded through recourse to the Commission of Hu-
man Rights, has no foundation.2" Third, the domestic applicabil-
ity of the Convention flows from the principle that Italian law is
to be adapted to international treaty law. The writers agree that,
where the international legal instrument contains a model legal
procedure or action, complete in all the essential elements and
which may be directly adopted by the domestic system, the in-
ternal implementation of the international model is automatic.
When the international instrument does not contain such a
model, however, it cannot be self-executing. To become effective,
See GRISOLI, supra note 1, at 35. The Court of Cassation at times renders
judgment by united divisions (sezione unite) which consists of a panel of fifteen
judges.
17 Case of Paolo Castro, decision of the "united division" of the Italian Supreme
Court of Cassation, November 23, 1988 [hereinafter Castro].
"' See Convention, supra note 4, § 1, art. 1 ("The High Contracting Parties shall
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Sec-
tion I of this Convention."); Id. § 1, Art. 13 ("Everyone whose rights and freedoms as
set forth in this convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a na-
tional authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity").
19 Castro, supra note 17.
20 id.
[Vol. 70: 1 01
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the domestic legal implications imposed by the instrument re-
quire state legislative action.2'
The Constitutional Court has agreed with the approach
taken by the United Divisions of the Court of Cassation.22 Sub-
sequent decisions in both criminal and civil matters have uni-
formly proceeded in this same direction.'
Recently, the Court of Cassation has had to face the question
of whether domestic laws enacted subsequent to the Convention
can have the effect of repealing the Convention's provisions, or
whether the norms of the Convention are more "resistant" than
the subsequent domestic norms. The Court's answer has been in
favor of the greater "resistance" of the provisions of the Conven-
tion over subsequent domestic norms.
In 1993, the Court of Cassation held this to be so in the case
of Juan Carlos Medrano.24 It is worth referring to this case in
greater detail for the distinctive way it applied the norms of the
Convention in its decision. Juan Carlos Medrano, an Argentin-
ean citizen, was found guilty by the Tribunal of Rome of a seri-
ous drug-related offense.' The Tribunal decided that upon com-
pletion of his sentence Medrano should be deported from Italian
territory. This latter provision was adopted on the basis of Sec-
tion 86 T.U. of the law on narcotic drugs no. 162 of 1990.26 That
provision expressly states that a foreigner found guilty of a seri-
21 Id.
2 See generally CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 2, at 76-77 (discussing interac-
tion of Court of Cassation and Constitutional Court).
2' See Stephen P. Freccero, An Introduction to the New Italian Criminal Proce-
dure, 21 AM 1. J. CRIM. L. 345, 354-55 (1994) (discussing constitutional court as final
interpretive authority of any constitutional provision whose decisions are retroac-
tively and dispositively applied in criminal cases).
24 Case of Juan Carlos Medrano, Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, 1993
[hereinafter Medrano].
2Id. There are three principal criminal courts in Italy which together consti-
tuted the equivalent of the American trial courts. Freccero, supra note 23, at 350.
The first, the Pretura, is the lowest of the three and consists of one judge. Id. The
judge decides on all crimes punishable by a maximum penalty of four years impris-
onment. Id. The second court is the Corte d'assise which is composed of eight judges
and has jurisdiction over felonies. Id. at 350-352. Finally, the Tribunale, which is
divided into judicial circuits ("circonderi") that roughly correspond to the Italian
provinces, is composed of three judges and has jurisdiction over all matters not as-
signed to the Pretura or the Corte d'assise. Id. at 352. Within its jurisdiction are
cases involving financial crimes, crimes committed by the press, and unlawful par-
ticipation in secret associations. Freccero, supra note 23, at 350; See generally
GRISOLI, supra note 1, at 33-47 (discussing hierarchy of Italian courts).
2 Law on Narcotic Drugs, no. 162, Legis. Ital. I. § 86 (1990).
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ous drug-related crime should be deported from the state upon
completion of his sentence.
Upon completion of his sentence, the Majistrato di sorveg-
lianza (the judge responsible for overseeing the carrying out of
the sentence) in Trieste ordered the expulsion of Medrano from
Italy.27 The decision was upheld by the Tribunale di sorveg-
lianza."8 Medrano appealed to the Court of Cassati, arguing that
the expulsion order was illegal because it went against the fun-
damental and inalienable rights relating to the protection of the
family and the education of children, recognized by both the
Italian Constitution and international treaties on human rights
ratified by the Italian government.29
The Court of Cassation posed two questions. The first issue
concerned the link between Section 86 of the 1990 law and Ar-
ticle 8 of the Convention,3 from which it might be concluded that
the obligation to deport is not automatic, but instead must be
27 Medrano, supra note 24. Magistrates are career judges in Italy. Freccero, su-
pra note 23, at 355. In the Italian criminal justice system, magistrates determine
the uilt or innocence of the defendant and the appropriate punishment. Id. at 356.
2 Medrano, supra note 24. The Tribunale di sorveglianza is the tribunale re-
sponsible for supervising the carrying out of sentences.
29 Medrano, supra note 24; see also Convention, supra note 4, § 1, art. 8
(declaring right to respect for private and family life); First Protocol to the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952,
art. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (requiring that states shall respect right of parents to edu-
cate children).
20 No. 162 Legisl. Ital. I. § 86.
3' Convention, supra note 4, § 1, art. 8. Article 8 of the Convention states:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security, the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder and crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of oth-
ers.
Id.
Respect for one's private and family life must be protected against any unlawful
interference by the State. G. Cohen-Jonathan, Respect for Private and Family Life,
in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 405 (R. St. J.
Macdonald et. al. eds., 1993). See also Marckx v. Belgium, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330, 331
(1979) ("Article 8 did not merely compel a state to abstain from interference in fam-
ily life, but might also impose positive obligations."); X and Y v. The Netherlands, 6
Eur. H.R. Rep. 311, 315 (1983) (discussing Government's obligation to secure respect
for private lives). In determining whether a positive obligation exists, a balance
must be struck between the general interests of the community and the interests of
the individual. Rees v. United Kingdom, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 64 (1986).
[Vol. 70: 101
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reconciled with the family interests of the person to be deported.
The second issue questioned the legitimacy of this proposed link.
Since Article 86 is a domestic legal provision enacted subsequent
to the Convention, the Court had to determine whether the pro-
visions of the Convention had greater weight and thus could not
be repealed by successive domestic laws. The Court answered
both questions in the affirmative.
As for the first question, the position taken by the judicial
bodies in Strasbourg, where Article 8 of the Convention was
drafted, was strictly followed. The Court held that in cases
where deportation might cause the breakdown in family unity
and life, it is necessary to look into the specific circumstances of
the case with a view to forming a decision which balances the
various interests concerned.2 Factors which are relevant when
considering deportation are the seriousness of the crime, the
ability of the family members to follow the person deported, and
the age and personal situations of the children and family mem-
bers in general.33
Turning to the second question, the court noted that special
weight is attached to the provisions of the Convention with re-
spect to successive domestic provisions because, following their
insertion into the Italian legal system, the provisions of the Con-
vention must be recognized as general principles.34 This conclu-
sion was approved by the Court of Justice of the European
Communities and was formally and incontestably recognized in
Article F of the Treaty of Maastricht.35 Since it had erroneously
32 Medrano, supra note 24. The Convention must always be interpreted in light
of current circumstances. See generally Cohen-Jonathan, supra note 31, at 412.
The interference by a public authority may be justified in order to protect human
health and morals, and the rights of others. See Convention, supra note 4, § 1, art.
8. If, however, an individual's offense is not serious, such punishments as deporta-
tion wrongly interfere with the family unit and are not justified. See Moustagium v.
Belgium, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802 (1991); see also Cohen-Jonathan, supra, note 31 at
412-13 (discussing B. v. France, App. No. 13343/87, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (Eur. Ct. of
H.R. 1992) (noting where consequences for applicant were disproportionate to gen-
eral societal interests).
Medrano, supra note 24.
See supra note 11 (comparing Convention's status with subsequent national
domestic law).
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. F, O.J. c224/1 (1992). The
Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht, went into effect upon ratification
by Germany. See Heinrich Kirschner, The Framework of the European Union Under
the Treaty of Maastricht, 13 J.L. & COM. 233 (1994). The treaty is part of the Euro-
pean Union's constitution and precludes Member State action in fields where it has
1996]
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considered the deportation order to be automatic without consid-
ering the interests protected by Article 8, paragraph 1 of the
Convention, the application of this conclusion to the Medrano
case led to the annulment of the appealed decision.36
CONCLUSION
With the decisions in Paolo Castro7 and Juan Carlos Me-
drano," the Court of Cassation has adapted to the trend pro-
moted by international judicial bodies, giving the widest possible
scope to the effect of the Convention within the interested
States. This goal was reached in an international spirit, a spirit
which should be emphasized because it represents an important
cultural and political victory. Atavistic parochial reluctance was
overcome. Even at the institutional level, the work was faced
with a spirit open to understanding and willingness, a spirit
which has always been a characteristic of the best Italian people.
legislated. Stephen Weatherill, Beyond Preemption? Shared Competence and Con-
stitutional Change in the European Community, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE
MAASTRICHT THEORY 13, 16 (David O'Keefe & Patrick M. Twomey eds., 1994).
Article F of the Treaty states "Itihe Union shall respect fundamental rights, as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result
from constitutional traditions common to the member states, as general principles
of community law." Treaty on European Union, supra at art. F.
36 Medrano, supra note 24.
3' Castro, supra note 17.
38 Medrano, supra note 24.
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